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THE RENTAL EPIDEMIC OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: A LOOK AT HOW NETFLIX
AND REDBOX ARE DAMAGING THE HEALTH OF
THE HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY AND HOW
TO STOP IT
I. INTRODUCTION'
The Hollywood film industry is hurting. DVD sales, which account
for up to seventy percent of a film's profits,
2 are slumping dramatically. 3
This is a serious problem for the film industry because many films only
start to turn a profit when people buy the DVDs. Since last year, DVD
sales have fallen over thirteen percent 5 and are expected to account for just
over half of the overall film industry revenue by 2013.6 This will cause the
1. This Comment uses the phrase "Netflix and Redbox" to generally refer to the emerging
commercial DVD rental industry. Netflix is an example of a DVD mail rental subscription
service. Netflix sends the DVDs directly to the subscriber's mailbox, and the person returns the
DVD by mailing it back in a prepaid envelope. Redbox is an example of a DVD rental kiosk
company, where people can rent and return a DVD from the same kiosk for a per night rental fee.
Netflix and Redbox are the leaders of their respective niches in the commercial DVD rental
industry. Also, this Comment will only briefly discuss Blockbuster. Blockbuster does not
generally use the First Sale Doctrine to operate, because Blockbuster has negotiated revenue-
sharing contracts with most movie studios.
2. Ronald Grover, Hollywood Ponders a Post-DVD Future, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009,
at 56.
3. Ronald Grover & Olga Kharif, Hollywood vs. Redbox, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 24, 2009, at
38.
4. John Horn, DVD Sales Figures Turn Every Film Into a Mystery, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2005, at Al ("Even a box-office blockbuster may reach profit only when it arrives on DVD
shelves because movies have become so expensive to produce and market."); Edward Jay
Epstein, Hollywood's Profits, Demystified, SLATE, Aug. 8, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2124078/ ("Nowadays, in the new Hollywood, the world box office is a
money loser.").
5. Marc Graser & Marcy Magiera, H'w "d Red Alert: Biz Grapples with DVD Kiosk Boom,
DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 26, 2009, at 1.
6. Analysis-Hollywood Warming to Internet as DVDs Begin to Fade, CNNMONEY.COM,
Sept. 30, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/reuters/MTFH16729_2009-10-
01_00-17-23_N30253574.htm.
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film industry to potentially lose billions of dollars in revenue.7 However,
the effects are already being felt. Major studios are funding fewer movies
8
and delaying releases for completed films, including ones that have Oscar
potential. 9 Furthermore, one former major studio is currently being forced
to put itself up on the auction block. 10 Overall, American film companies
will release forty percent fewer movies between September and December
this year compared to last. 11 Consequently, there are fewer jobs
available. 12
However, people have not stopped watching movies. Rather than
buying movies, many people are renting them. 13 In the first half of 2009,
consumer spending on rentals grew over eight percent. 14 While the
Hollywood studios are suffering, Netflix and Redbox are seeing their
profits flourish, growing twenty percent and 110 percent respectively in the
second quarter of 2009. '5 While the rental industry's revenue is growing
substantially, the companies that actually make the product are seeing their
revenues plummet. 16
One of the reasons why such a perverse outcome exists is because of
the First Sale Doctrine. 17 This doctrine states that once a person buys a
copyrighted item from the owner, the seller no longer has the right to
prevent the buyer from reselling it, giving it away, or lending it out. 18
Libraries, eBay, Craigslist, and many other companies use this doctrine to
7. David B. Wilkerson, Studios Feel Pinch of Slowing DVD Sales, Rise in Rentals,
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/studios-hurt-as-dvd-sales-
fall-and-rentals-grow-2009-09-22/ [hereinafter Studios Feel Pinch].
8. See Brooks Barnes, MGM, Ousting Its C.E.O., Hires Turnaround Expert, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2009, at B4 (discussing MGM studios' declining movie production).
9. Nikki Finke, Shocker! Paramount Moves Scorsese's 'Shutter Island' to February 19,
2010, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.deadline.com/hollywood/shocker-
paramount-moving-scorsesedicaprios-shutter-island-to-february-2010/.
10. Dave McNary, MGM Officially on the Block, VARIETY, Nov. 13, 2009,
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118011324.html.
11. Michael Cieply, Oscar Race May Heat Up At Festival In Toronto, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2009, at CI.
12. Gina Keating, Disney to Produce Fewer Movies, Cut 650 Jobs, REDORBIT, July 19,
2006,
http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/578257/disney-to-produce-fewermovies-cut-650.jobs
/index.html.
13. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
14. Id.
15. Ben Fritz, Warner Delays Rentals, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at B3.
16. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
17. 17 U.S.C. §109 (2006).
18. JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MAUREEN A. O'ROURKE,
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 374 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2006).
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operate their businesses. 19 Unfortunately for the film industry, Netflix and
Redbox are using this doctrine to their own commercial advantage. In
some instances, Netflix and Redbox have negotiated revenue-sharing or
similar types of agreements with studios. 20 But when negotiations fail,
Netflix and Redbox go to a store, buy the DVD for twenty dollars, and then
rent the disc to their customers. 21  Netflix has only reached agreements
with half of the Hollywood studios,22 which means that a significant
amount of Netflix's discs are bought and rented under the protection of the
First Sale Doctrine.23
Seeing their revenues vanish, some studios are trying to stand up to
Redbox 24 and, more recently, to Netflix. 25 Twentieth Century Fox (Fox),
Warner Brothers Studios (Warner Bros.), and Universal Studios
(Universal) are refusing to sell Redbox any DVDs through their
wholesalers until at least twenty-eight days after the DVDs have been
released to the general public (a "sales-only window").26  In early 2010,
Warner Bros. and Netflix came to a mutual agreement that will similarly
delay the studio's newly released DVDs from reaching Netflix customers
for twenty-eight days. 27 Other studios may soon follow suit. 28
However, this plan to salvage the film industry's main revenue stream
will probably not work because Netflix and Redbox can still buy a DVD at
a retail store and rent it to their customers. 29 In fact, Redbox may soon
sign a deal with Best Buy, Wal-Mart, or Target to buy discounted DVDs to
stock its vending machines if it cannot purchase the newly released DVDs
19. Id.
20. Patrick Goldstein, If You Can't Beat Redbox, Join It, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at Dl
("Sony and maverick indie Lionsgate, recently agreed to long-term distribution deals with
Redbox, netting the studios hundreds of millions in revenues in exchange for guaranteeing
Redbox a free flow of DVD product."); Danny King, Physical: Company's CFO Praises
Blockbuster's Store Closure Strategy, VIDEO Bus., Sept. 16, 2009,
http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA6697417.html ("Netflix's revenue-sharing agreements
with movie studios account for about half of the DVDs the U.S. leader in movie-rentals via mail
ships to its subscribers.").
21. See Ryan Nakashima, Studios Not Yet Sure How to Handle $1-A-Day Rentals, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2009, at 2C.
22. King, supra note 20.
23. See generally Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns, 474 F.3d 365, 373
(6th Cir. 2007).
24. Goldstein, supra note 20.
25. Carl DiOrio, WB, Nefflix Hit Pause, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 7, 2010, at 1.
26. Goldstein, supra note 20.
27. DiOrio, supra note 25.
28. Adam Satariano, Netllix, Studios Discussing 'Sale-Only 'for DVDS, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601 1O&sid=a6wj6dbUGsRg.
29. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 374.
330 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:327
directly from the studio. It is hard to imagine that the First Sale Doctrine
was created to allow for such a situation. Furthermore, there are
inconsistent rental policies across the industry that could undermine the
sales-only windows.31 If the studios' sales-only window applies only to
Redbox (like the policies implemented by Fox and Universal), people can
rent the DVD from Netflix; 32 if the sales-only window applies to both
Netflix and Redbox (like the policy implemented by Warner Bros.), people
can rent the DVD from Blockbuster. 33 Absent a consistent national rental
policy, people can still rent DVDs from another rental company the day it
is released. 3 Consequently, Congress must act to stop the commercial
DVD rental business from distorting and abusing the First Sale Doctrine.
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the First Sale
Doctrine and the history of the rental industry. Part III examines the
current exceptions to the First Sale Doctrine in the U.S. and the reasons
why the exceptions are necessary. Part IV reviews European Copyright
law, which bars a business from renting out a cinematic work without the
permission of the copyright holder.35 Finally, Part V proposes an
important exception to the Copyright Act barring major commercial
companies from renting out DVDs unless they share the revenue with the
copyright holder.
30. Ahead of the Bell: Redbox Rental Dispute, THESTREET.COM, Oct. 12, 2009,
http://www.cdn.thestreet.con/story/10610096/l/ahead-of-the-bell-redbox-rental-dispute.html
[hereinafter Ahead of the Bell].
31. See Goldstein, supra note 20 (discussing how Sony and Lionsgate have agreed to sell
DVDs to Redbox as soon as the DVD hits the market); King, supra note 20 (discussing how
Netflix has revenue-sharing agreements with many studios, which allow them to get the DVDs as
soon as the DVD is sold on the open market). Contra Goldstein, supra note 20 (discussing how
some studios are waiting 28 days before they sell their DVDs to Redbox); DiOrio, supra note 25
(discussing how Warner Bros. and Netflix agreed to wait twenty-eight days after a DVD hits the
market before Netflix starts renting it to its customers).
32. See Goldstein, supra note 20. The current practices by Twentieth Century Fox and
Universal Studios target only Redbox. Consequently, a consumer can go to any other video
rental store and rent the DVD. Id.
33. See DiOrio, supra note 25 (discussing how Warner Brothers and Netflix have agreed to
delay new-release discs reaching Netflix for twenty-eight days).
34. See Goldstein, supra note 20; DiOrio, supra note 25.
35. GuY TRITTON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 501 (Thomson 3d ed.
2008). See Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L.346) 61 (EC).
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND THE HISTORY OF
THE RENTAL INDUSTRY
A. The Creation of the First Sale Doctrine
The intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution allows
Congress to give copyright owners limited monopolies over their work in
order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."36  By
recognizing this limited but exclusive right, copyright law gives an
economic incentive to people who create and disseminate ideas.37 The
U.S. Supreme Court has held: "The economic philosophy behind the
clause.., is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare .... , The
ultimate aim is to stimulate creative works for the public good, and this is
done by securing a fair return for the author's work. 3
However, the courts have sometimes held that in order to promote
creative works for the public good, it is necessary to limit copyright
holders' rights. 40 In Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus, the Supreme Court
heard a case that dealt with the book, "The Castaway. ' 41 The publishers
put a notice in the book stating that anyone reselling the book must sell it
for one dollar, the same price as a new book. 42 After buying the books
from a wholesale dealer, the defendants ignored the notice and resold the
book for eighty-nine cents per copy. 43 The publishers filed suit. 44 The
Court ultimately decided that "the copyright statutes, while protecting the
owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do
not create the right to impose, by notice.., a limitation at which the book
shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of
contract., 45 In another case, the Court further explained its rationale:
The limited monopoly created by copyright law is needed to
promote the creation of new works and ensure that the creator is
properly compensated for this effort. Once a copyright holder
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
39. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
40. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
41. Id. at 341.
42. Id. at 342.
43. Id. at 341.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 350.
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has consented to distribution of a copy of that work, this
monopoly is no longer needed because the owner has received
the desired compensation for that copy. 
46
The Court's limitation on the copyright holder's distribution right is based
on the principle that a person is entitled to only the full value-no more, no
less-of the copyrighted work upon its disposition.47
The Court's opinion was later dubbed "The First Sale Doctrine," and
Congress codified this holding in the 190948 and 1976 Copyright Acts.
4
1
These acts neither expanded nor diminished the power of the doctrine.5 o
B. The History and Evolution of the Rental Industry
Although home video technology was invented in 1956, the average
consumer could not afford home video until the mid-1970s when Sony's
Betamax and JVC's VHS were released.51 In November 1977, Fox
became the first studio to provide movies on home video. 52 The videos
were intended for private use only, and cost $49.95. However, just a
month later, the first video rental store was opened in West Los Angeles. 5
George Atkinson bought these Fox titles for $3.00 over cost to rent them
out to the community. 55 To rent a video, people had to buy a membership,
either $50 for an annual membership or $100 for a lifetime membership,
and pay $10 per day to rent a video. 56 Although it was expensive, renting
videos gained in popularity and caught the attention of the movie studios. 57
Atkinson was quickly threatened with a lawsuit for renting these videos to
46. Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns, 474 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2007).
47. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F.Supp. 1378, 1389 (C.D. Cal.
1993).
48. Nancy B. Lewson, The Videocassette Rental Controversy: The Future State of the Law,
30 COPR. SOC. U.S.A. 1, 5 (1982); The Copyright Act of 1909 § 27, 35 Stat. 1075 (current
version at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008)).
49. Lewson, supra note 48, at 5 (1982); The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109
(1976).
50. Lewson, supra note 48, at 5 (1982); 17 U.S.C. § 109.
51. Sylvie Castonguay, 50 Years of the Video Cassette Recorder, 6 WIPO MAGAZINE, Nov.
2006, at 9.
52. The Entertainment Merchant Association, A History of Home Video and Video Game
Retailing, http://entmerch.org/industrybhistory.html [hereinafter History of Home Video] (last
visited Feb. 7, 2010).
53. Id.
54. Id.; Dennis McLellan, George Atkinson, 69; Pioneer in the Movie Video Rental
Industry, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at B17.
55. McLellan, supra note 54, at B17; History of Home Video, supra note 52.
56. History of Home Video, supra note 52.
57. Id.
2010] THE RENTAL EPIDEMIC OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 333
the public, but it was soon determined that the video rental industry is
protected under the First Sale Doctrine. 
5 8
The film industry soon saw the video rental industry as a major threat
to its business. 59  The President of the Motion Picture Association of
America, Jack Valenti, famously stated before Congress, "I say to you that
the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the
Boston strangler is to the woman home alone." 60 From 1982 to 1983, the
film industry tried to push through Congress an exception to the First Sale
Doctrine, which would prevent video stores from renting out movies
without the copyright holder's permission. 61  These efforts ultimately
failed, and the video rental industry was here to stay.62
Since the studios had to fird a way to stay profitable and compete
with this emerging technology, they decided to come up with a "rental
price" scheme in the early 1980s.63 The studio would initially release its
video for a very high price-approximately $100-and the typical buyer
would be a video rental business. 64 Five or six months later, the price
would drop to approximately twenty dollars, after which the typical buyers
would be "end-users." 65 The video rental industry was a huge success for
the film studios. 66 Within ten years of VHS and Betamax players being
released to the public, combined video sales and rentals eclipsed total box
office revenue.67 Shortly thereafter, video rental revenues exceeded box
office receipts for the first time and continue to do so today. 68
In the late 1990s, the DVD was introduced in the U.S. and became
"the most rapidly adopted consumer electronics product in history."
' 69
Beginning in 2004, people started to rent more DVDs than VHS tapes.70
A dramatic difference in the evolution between the DVD and VHS
58. Id.
59. Castonguay, supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. History of Home Video, supra note 52.
62. Id.
63. JULIE HOLLAND MORTIMER, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF DVD's 2 (2006),
http://mortimer.fas.harvard.edu/06dvdl 117.pdf [hereinafter PRICE DISCRIMINATION].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. History of Home Video, supra note 52.
67. Id. ("Rental revenue in 1986 was $3.37 billion and sales revenue that year was $1.01
billion, for a total of $4.38 billion. Theatrical box office was $3.78 billion in 1986.").
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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formats is that the linear rental pricing formula was never adopted for
DVDs. 71 The linear rental pricing formula was important during the VHS
era because it helped recoup some of the losses when people would rent
videos instead of buying them. 72 However, this advantage has since
dissipated because studios now release DVDs for one low price, and have
not shown any signs of implementing a linear rental pricing formula. 73
With DVD sales already dropping significantly, implementing such a
formula could have catastrophic consequences for the film industry.74
Today, the two most popular DVD rental services, behind only
Blockbuster, are Netflix and Redbox.7 5 Netflix and Redbox have been
around since 1998 and 2002, respectively, but their popularity has exploded
during the past few years.7' Netflix is an example of a DVD mail rental
subscription service. Netflix sends the DVDs directly to the subscriber's
mailbox, and the subscriber returns the DVD by mailing it back in a
prepaid envelope. Today, Netflix has more than ten million
subscribers. 9
Redbox is an example of an automatic rental kiosk where people can
rent DVDs for a daily fee. 80 Each kiosk holds approximately 630 DVDs.8 1
Originally placed in McDonald's restaurants, Redbox kiosks today can be
found in restaurants and grocery stores across the country. 82 Presently,
there are over 19,000 Redbox kiosks that rent out over 575 million
DVDs. 83
71. PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Grover & Kharif, supra note 3, at 38.
75. In the first quarter of 2009, Redbox's revenue was $154 million, while Netflix's revenue
was $394 million. Redbox 's Vending Machines Are Giving Nef/lix Competition, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2009, at B4. In the second quarter of 2009, Blockbuster's revenue from rentals was $789.2
million. Blockbuster's Loss Exceeds Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at B4.
76. Press Kit, Redbox, The History of Redbox 1,
http://redboxpressroom.com/factsheets/TheHistoryofRedbox.pdf [hereinafter History of Redbox]
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009); History of Home Video, supra note 52.
77. Press Kit, Nefflix, Consumer Press Kit 2 (2009),
http://cdn.nflximg.com/us/pdf/ConsumerPressKit.pdf [hereinafter Netflix Press Kit].
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5.
80. History of Redbox, supra note 76, at 1.
81. Press Kit, Redbox, Redbox Fact Sheet 1,
http://redboxpressroom.com/factsheets/RedboxFactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2010).
82. History of Redbox, supra note 76, at 1.
83. Id.; Redbox, Redbox Press Room, http://redboxpressroom.com/ [hereinafter Redbox
Press Room] (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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III. EXCEPTIONS To THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
A. The Record Rental Amendment of 1984
The first successful attempt to amend the First Sale Doctrine by the
entertainment industry came in 1984. 84  During that time, the record
industry was facing a serious piracy problem. 85  Instead of buying a
phonorecord, people were renting music records and copying them onto
blank tapes. 8 6 While Congress debated the Record Rental Amendment,
there were about 200 commercial record rental stores renting phonorecords
for one dollar a day. 87 Congress also noted: "Frequently, blank audio
cassette tapes [were] sold in the same establishment. One such
establishment advertised, 'Never, ever buy another record."' 
88
The record industry proved to Congress that there was a direct link
between commercial renting and the illegal copying of a record. 89 The
record industry convinced Congress that the "commercial record rental and
duplication may directly and adversely affect the ability of copyright
holders to exercise their reproduction and distribution rights under the
Copyright Act." 90  As a result, Congress passed the Record Rental
Amendment of 1984, which generally prohibits the owner of a phonorecord
from renting it for commercial advantage to the public. 91 By pointing to a
real and significant threat to its survival, the record industry succeeded in
obtaining an exception to the First Sale Doctrine. 9
2
It is important to note that Congress limited this exception to people
who tried to obtain a direct or indirect commercial advantage by renting a
phonorecord to the public. 93 This exception does not prohibit the rental,
lease, or lending of phonorecords by libraries that are not-for-profit. 94
84. See Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
85. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 323 (Matthew Bender &
Co. 4th ed. 2005).
86. Id.
87. H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
92. LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 324.
93. Id. at 323; Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727
(1984).
94. LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 323.
336 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:327
B. The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990
Unlike the situation the record industry faced, the computer software
industry effectively persuaded Congress to preemptively act against a threat
to its industry. 95 Although there was some renting of computer software,
the threat of piracy and the purpose of renting computer software
convinced Congress to act. 96 Congress recognized that, unlike
entertainment products such as phonorecords, software is a utilitarian
product. 9' "Short term rental of software is, under most circumstances,
inconsistent with the purposes for which software is intended." 98  For
example, the Microsoft Office program is intended to be used long-term on
a consistent basis, instead of being rented out every time a person needs to
write a paper. 99 Furthermore, "[r]ental of software will, most likely,
encourage unauthorized copying, deprive copyright owners of a return on
investment, and thereby discourage creation of new products." 100 An
organized computer software rental industry would have threatened the
software industry's economic health. '0'
Thus, Congress passed the Computer Software Rental Amendments
Act of 1990, which generally bars a software owner from renting out
computer software to the public for direct or indirect commercial
advantage. 102 As with the phonorecord exception, this exception does not
prohibit the rental, lease, or lending of computer programs by libraries that
are not-for-profit. 103
C. California Resale Royalty Act
Although the California Resale Royalty Act is not a true exception to
the First Sale Doctrine, California passed this interesting state law that
95. Id. at 324.
96. Id.
97. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939.
98. Id.
99. LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 324.
100. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939 (emphasis
added).
101. 136 CONG. REc. S17, 577 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch) available
at http://thomas.loc.gov (follow "Congressional Record" hyperlink; then select Congress "101";
enter date "10/27/90" through "10/27/90" and select "search"; then open "Judicial Improvement
Act" document hyperlink).
102. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939; LEAFFER,
supra note 85, at 324.
103. COHEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 372.
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contradicts the First Sale Doctrine's principles. 104 The California Resale
Royalty Act applies to fine art works and entitles an artist to a royalty
payment of five percent upon the resale of his or her copyrighted work if
the resale is for $1,000 or more. 105
While California is the only state that recognizes the resale royalty
right, other countries do have similar laws. 106 In fact, droit de suite, or the
resale royalty right, is a European concept, 107 which the European Union
(EU) requires all members to respect. 108
There are several benefits to a resale royalty act. 109 The most popular
rationale is that profits from a resale give an artist added incentive to
produce more works of fine art. 110 Because creators of fine art are
generally at a disadvantage compared to other authors and composers who
can sell many copies of their copyrighted works, these laws help remedy
this disparity by allowing a fine artist to collect multiple times from one
piece of work. "' Also, "allowing the purchaser to reap all the benefit of
the increased value of the work is a form of unjust enrichment that comes
at the expense of the original artist." 112
Despite these benefits, the California Resale Royalty Act has been
severely criticized in the U.S. and abroad. 113 One common criticism is that
it benefits too few artists and hurts the California market. 114 Because this
act only applies to sales in California or by California residents, people
avoid buying art in the California art market. 115 Also, "[i]t is clear the
California Resale Royalty Act has been ignored and brushed under the
carpet by all those in the California legal and art market." 116 This is
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (2009).
105. Id.
106. California Arts Council, California Resale Royalty Act,
http://www.cac.ca.gov/resaleroyaltyact/resaleroyaltyact.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
107. LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 328.
108. Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 35.
109. See generally Gary Pulsinelli, Harry Potter and the Re(order) of the Artists: Are We
Muggles or Goblins?, 87 OR. L. REv. 1101, 1115-17 (2008).
110. Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An
Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265, 272-73 (1992) ("One can argue that the
potential for increased remuneration is a potent incentive for further creation.").
111. Pulsinelli, supra note 109, at 1115.
112. Id. at 1116.
113. See Mara Grumbo, Note, Accepting Droit de Suite as an Equal and Fair Measure
Under Intellectual Property Law and Contemplation of Its Implementation in the United States
Post Passage of the EUDirective, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 371 (2008).
114. LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 329.
115. Id.
116. Grumbo, supra note 113, at 371.
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because enforcement of the California law is incredibly difficult. "1' The
law requires the seller to withhold the royalty, find the artist, and send the
artist the proceeds. 118 There is no central collection agency to administer
the system, so the only way to enforce the statute is through lawsuits from
the artists. 119 Therefore, the artists are required to follow every art sale in
California to see if one of their copyrighted works was sold and then sue
the gallery owners to recover any unpaid royalties. 120 This makes
enforcement impractical and impossible. 121
The situation is starkly different in the European Union. The EU's
droit de suite law122 has been much more successful. 123 The first
significant difference between the EU law and the California Law is the
existence of a dedicated collection society. 124 Art dealers pay the royalty
directly to the dedicated collection society, and that agency enforces
compliance with the law. 125 The second significant difference is that, so
far, the law has only applied to auctions. 126 While the law technically
covers most sales by art dealers, implementation and enforcement of the
law has focused on auctions. 127 Although not perfect, applying this law
exclusively to auctions still covers a considerable amount of art sales, and
makes it significantly easier to enforce. 128 Payment is the responsibility of
the auctioneer instead of the seller, and auctions are easier to regulate than
private art sales. 129
Droit de suite laws are important to the present discussion because
these laws emphasize the viewpoint that the original copyright owner's
economic and moral rights sometimes need to be recognized for the public
good. 130 Unlike the current First Sale Doctrine exceptions, the purpose for
117. Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the
Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 509, 523 (1995).
118. Id.
119. Eliza Hall, The French Exception: Why The Resale Royalty Works in France and Why
It Matters To the US., 1 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 321, 331 (2007).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 35.
123. Hall, supra note 119, at 331.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 332.
126. Id. at 325 (noting that the EU Directive is relatively new and enforcement has been
focused on auctions thus far).
127. Id. at 332.
128. Hall, supra note 119, at 325.
129. Id. at 332.
130. See Grumbo, supra note 113, at 371.
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adopting a droit de suite law was not to curtail the threat of art piracy. 131
Rather, these droit de suite laws are designed to economically and morally
promote the public good. 132 The party that pays the additional
compensation is the party who is actually profiting from the copyright
owner's work. 133 These laws address the issue that artwork may be under
produced if the artist can only receive profits from the original sale. 134
Without an economic incentive, significant harm can be done to the public
good because there will be less creative artwork for the public to enjoy. 135
Like the intellectual property clause in the U.S. Constitution, these
incentive-based laws help promote the progress of the useful arts. 136
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S "RENTAL RIGHT DIRECTIVE"
The European Union (EU) has passed an exception to its copyright
law similar to the one this Comment will later propose. 131 Since 1994, the
EU's "Rental Right Directive" (Directive) established the exclusive right
for the copyright owner to authorize or prohibit the rental, lease, or lending
of her cinematic work. 138
In adopting this legislation, the European community stated that there
was a legitimate economic justification to recognize the right to proceeds
from a rental. 139 Additionally, with the threat of piracy, the Directive notes
that rental revenues of copyrighted works play an important role in
offsetting the loss of income. 140 The Directive finally states that this law is
needed to continue the economic and cultural development of the EU. 141
European copyright scholars have lauded the Directive. 142 Supporters
131. See generally Hall, supra note 119, at 324.
132. Id. at 324 (commenting that the purpose of a droit de suite law is typically to benefit
starving artists and to give them a greater economic incentive to produce works of art).
133. Grumbo, supra note 113, at 367 (noting that it is the obligation of the seller to pay the
royalty due to the copyright owner).
134. COHEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 414.
135. See id.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
137. See infra Part V.D; Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8
BARRY L. REV. 43, 92 (2007).
138. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 501; see also Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992
O.J. (L 346) 61.
139. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 500; see also Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992
O.J. (L 346) 61.
140. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 500.
141. Barbosa, supra note 137, at 92.
142. 1 DAVID T. KEELING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EU LAW 281 (Oxford
2003).
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argue "that even the most devoted film buff rarely watches a film more
than once or twice." 143 Supporters also note that, as in the U.S., the
revenue from rentals could be the most profitable part of the market.' 44
Logically, more films will be made if the copyright owners expect a
reasonable return on their investment. 145 Because of this, these supporters
argue that it is in everyone's interest to allow the copyright owner to
receive some money when the copyrighted work is rented. 146
Even when rental companies have to comply with the Directive, the
DVD rental industry can still be sustainable and profitable. 1
4
LOVEFiLM, a European counterpart to Netflix, has over one million
subscribers and has expanded from England to four other European
countries. 148 Despite the enormous amount of money it costs to start an
online DVD rental business, LOVEFiLM began to turn a profit within three
years of its creation. 49
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FILM INDUSTRY AND THE SOLUTION To
FIX IT
A. The Film Industry is Suffering
Unlike the early 1980s when the first attempt to pass a video rental
exception to the First Sale Doctrine failed, 15  the landscape of the
entertainment industry has substantially changed. 151 According to Rentrak,
in the first half of 2009, U.S. consumer spending on DVDs fell 13.5%. 152
143. Id.
144. Id.; see generally Grover, supra note 2.
145. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[E]ncouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare ... .
146. KEELING, supra note 142, at 281.
147. See Helia Ebrahimi, BBC Fiasco Helps LoveFilm Turn a Profit, THIS IS MONEY, Nov.
8, 2008, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/article.html?in-articleid=456774.
148. LOVEFiLM International, What We're About,
http://www.lovefilm.com/corporate/about.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
149. Ebrahimi, supra note 147.
150. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 372.
151. In the early 1980s, the studios feared the new technology and thought it was going to
significantly harm the industry. Castonguay, supra note 51, at 9-10. Today, the movie industry
has embraced the video rental market and substantially depends on it to turn a profit on many of
its films. Horn, supra note 4 ("Even a box-office blockbuster may reach profit only when it
arrives on DVD shelves because movies have become so expensive to produce and market.");
Epstein, supra note 4 ("Nowadays, in the new Hollywood, the world box office is a money
loser.").
152. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5, at 1.
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Adams Media Research conservatively predicts that DVD sales will drop
by 9% this year. 153 A significant amount of revenue is being lost because
physical home entertainment video currently accounts for 70% of film
profits. 154 This means that there are, potentially, billions of dollars at
stake. 155
Specifically, many film studios are struggling to stay solvent or, at the
very least, are delaying films in the hope that the economy will rebound. 156
MGM-UA has only released one film in 2009, but faces $300 million in
annual loan interest payments and a $1 billion loan payment in June
2011. 157 Facing these enormous payments, MGM-UA has decided to
entertain bids to buy out part or all of the company. 158 Additionally, some
films' release dates are being delayed, partly due to home video sales. 159
According to one studio source, "[g]iven where the DVD business is in
2009, our only hope is the economy and the retail business rebounds in
2010 because the hardest hit segment has been movies that play to an older
adult audience." 160
During the VHS era, the commercial video rental market was
extremely profitable for the film studios industry. 161 This was because the
film studios had developed a linear rental pricing structure to account for
the lost revenue due to video rentals, and had revenue-sharing agreements
with the major rental retailers. 162 However, there is no such linear rental
pricing structure in place today. 163 It is also more common for rental
companies to not have any rental agreement with the studios and instead
use the protection of the First Sale Doctrine to operate. 164 At least 39% of
Redbox's rental revenue comes from studios with which it does not have a
153. Grover & Kharif, supra note 3, at 38.
154. Grover, supra note 2, at 56.
155. See generally David B. Wilkerson, Battles with Redbox, Neylix Underscore Shift as
Consumers Buy Less, Rent More, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 22, 2009,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/studios-hurt-as-dvd-sales-fall-and-rentals-grow-2009-09-22.
156. See generally Barnes, supra note 8; Finke, supra note 9.
157. Barnes, supra note 8.
158. McNary, supra note 10.
159. See Finke, supra note 9.
160. Id.
161. James J. Jozefowicz, Jason M. Kelley & Stephanie M. Brewer, New Release: An
Empirical Analysis of VHS/DVD Rental Success, ATL. ECON. J., June 2008,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejoumals/article/181301267.html.
162. PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 2; History of Home Video, supra note 52.
163. PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 2 ("With the introduction of the DVD
format, studios have almost exclusively adopted sell-through pricing ... .
164. See generally Ahead of the Bell, supra note 30.
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rental agreement, 165 while Netflix's revenue-sharing agreements roughly
account for half of the company's revenue.166
Lately, Hollywood studios tried a "sell-through" model, which
focuses on having the consumer buy the DVD. 167 The downside to this
model is that these DVDs are available to video rental stores for a very
cheap price. 168 In order to make up for the lost revenue due to video
rentals, more people need to buy DVDs. 169 Unfortunately for Hollywood,
this is not happening now as all trends indicate that more people are opting
to rent movies instead of purchasing DVDs. 170
Since the trend of declining DVD sales has been going on for the past
five years, 171 retail stores are starting to lose faith in the product, which
will exacerbate the problem. 172 For example, Best Buy Company and
Borders Group Inc. are allocating less physical space in their stores to
DVDs. 173 In stores that had been opened for at least a year, Borders Group
saw DVD sales drop 48% compared to the same period in 2008. 174 Once
comprising 23% of its sales, Borders Group now says that DVD sales
represent just 8% of its sales. 175 It will be much harder for DVD sales to
rebound if there are physically fewer DVDs being sold in the stores. 176
During these tough economic times, more people are choosing to rent
movies rather than spend more money to purchase them. 177 "In the first
half of [2009], U.S. consumer spending on DVD and Blu-ray rentals rose
8.3%." 178 During this time period, DVD sales fell to $5.4 billion, while
rental revenue grew to $3.4 billion. 179 In the second quarter of 2009,
Redbox's revenue grew 110%, and Netflix's revenue grew 20%. 180 By
165. Id.
166. King, supra note 20.
167. JUDSON COPLAN, DIAGNOSING THE DVD DISAPPOINTMENT: A LIFE CYCLE VIEW 6
(2006) http://w4.stem.nyu.edu/glucksman/docs/Coplan.pdf.
168. See generally PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 2.
169. The Green Mile was originally released on VHS for $107.95 and on DVD for $24.95.
Although there may be different costs in producing and shipping a VHS and DVD, the studios
were making a lot more money per film sold on VHS as compared to DVD. Id.
170. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
171. COPLAN, supra note 167, at 2.
172. Studios Feel Pinch, supra note 7.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. See generally id. (noting how retailers have lost faith in DVDs).
177. See id.; Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
178. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
179. Studios Feel Pinch, supra note 7.
180. Fritz, supra note 15.
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2013, an industry analyst predicted that Netflix's revenue will grow by
42% to $3.1 billion and that kiosk revenue will increase by more than
200% to $1.5 billion. 181 In cases where the rental company does not have a
rental agreement with the studio, a one-time purchase of $20 for a DVD
yields a $12 per disc profit on average, not including business costs and
selling the discs to consumers or wholesalers. 182 Considering that Redbox
has over 575 million DVDs in over 19,000 kiosks across the US, 183 the
profits add up very quickly for Redbox. 184
Mitch Lowe, CEO of Redbox, has tried to argue that "[t]he
relationship between rentals and DVD sell-through remains
complementary, not cannibalistic." 185 He also claims that, "[a]ccording to
customer research, a majority of Redbox renters report their typical DVD
purchase is the result of having previously rented and enjoyed the title." 186
However, these findings do not negate the fact that DVD sales are
plummeting while the rental business continues to flourish. 187 President
Chase Carey of News Corp., the parent company of Fox, complained that
its DVD "product rent at a dollar is grossly undervalued." 188 Likewise,
John Marmaduke points out that retailers "simply cannot give away
products that cost hundreds of millions of dollars to produce.... Once the
main product of an industry is artificially devalued, the negative economic
impacts will ripple throughout the industry, impacting the workers and
businesses that rely on the overall industry." 189
In particular, studios are having a very difficult time deciding which
movies to produce because DVD sales play such an important role in the
decision-making process. 190 Just a few years ago, studios could expect
181. Randall Stross, When the Price Is Right, the Future Can Wait, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
2009, at B3.
182. David Lieberman, Video Kiosks Have Rivals Seeing Red, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2009,
at 3B ("Redbox pays about $18 for a DVD and rents it about 15 times at an average of $2 per
transaction. The company sells half of the used DVDs back to wholesalers for as much as $4 per
disc, and sells about 3% directly to consumers for about $7. It destroys most of the rest.").
183. History of Redbox, supra note 76, at 1; Redbox Press Room, supra note 83.
184. See generally Graser & Magiera, supra note 5, at 1.
185. Mitch Lowe, Redbox Chief: 'We Are an Engine for Industry Growth', THE WRAP,
Oct. 2, 2009, http://thewrap.com/blog-entry/redbox-ceo-we-are-engine-industry-growth-8165.
186. Id.
187. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5, at 1. See generally Lieberman, supra note 182.
188. Lieberman, supra note 182.
189. Redbox Roulette: Gambling with the Industry's Future, THE WRAP, Oct. 7, 2009,
http://www.thewrap.com/blog-entry/redbox-roulette-gambling-industrys- future-8360 [hereinafter
Redbox Roulette].
190. Susanne Ault, DVD Payoff Formulas Are Tricky to Predict, WEEKLY VARIETY, Sept.
7, 2009, at 7.
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DVDs to generate eighty-five cents for every dollar a film grossed at the
box office. 191 However, since 2008, this number has dropped substantially,
as DVD titles have generated only seventy cents per box office dollar. 192
Playing it safe, studios are producing a substantially smaller amount of
films each year. 193 Studios will now have to factor into their formula the
likelihood that the film is going to be rented instead of purchased. '94 Over
the summer, distributors were baffled as to why "Paul Blart: Mall Cop"
was selling so slowly off the shelves. '95 Yet right around the same time,
newspapers were noting how "Paul Blart: Mall Cop" was Redbox's
"record-holding rental title." 196 In significant numbers, people decided to
rent that movie for one dollar rather than purchase it for twenty dollars. 197
B. The DVD Rental Business is Being Unjustly Enriched at the Expense of
the Studios
The current landscape of the industry is perverse. 198 The studios,
which actually create the copyrighted work, are seeing their revenues
vanish 199 and are trying to come up with new strategies to stay viable as
they produce fewer movies each year. 200 However, the rental business
which disseminates the copyrighted work, in many cases without fairly
compensating the original copyright owner, continues to thrive and
expand. 201
As stated earlier, the primary objective of the intellectual property
clause in the U.S. Constitution is to benefit the public by promoting the
production of original works, and this is done by compensating the
authors. 202 In Fox Film Corp. v. Doval, the Supreme Court held that "the
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Cieply, supra note 11.
194. Compare id. (discussing how "Paul Blart: Mall Cop" did not sell as many copies as
expected), with Stross, supra note 181 (noting how "Paul Blart: Mall Cop" was Redbox's most
popular rental).
195. Ault, supra note 190.
196. Stross, supra note 181.
197. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Cieply, supra note 11.
201. See generally Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
202. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 430 (2004).
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of authors. 203 Later, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, the
Supreme Court affirmed its reasoning by stating: "Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts." 20 The Court further explained in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. that the First Sale Doctrine "is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired." 
205
For decades, the rental industry and the studios enjoyed a
complimentary relationship; both were able to thrive and grow together. 206
This relationship thrived because of the linear rental pricing scheme and
revenue-sharing agreements that existed between the studios and rental
20companies. 07 The linear rental pricing scheme enabled studios to cover
the lost revenue from rentals up front by charging a very high initial
price.208 For retail outlets like Blockbuster that did not want to pay this
high price, studios entered into revenue-sharing agreements under which
the studios sold the videos to the rental company at a lower price in return
for a share of its revenue. 209 In the end, the rental companies had two
choices: (1) purchase the video at a high price offered to the general
public; or (2) purchase the video directly from the studio's distributor at a
lower price and enter into a revenue-sharing agreement. 210 Both options
resulted in a mutually beneficial solution in which studios recovered their
lost video-sale income from the video rental industry, while video rental
companies benefitted from decreased video sales. 211
This complimentary relationship no longer exists today. 212 There is
no linear rental pricing scheme.213 Today, consumers are able to buy
DVDs at a reasonable price as soon as the DVD becomes available on the
203. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
204. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
205. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
206. JULIE HOLLAND MORTIMER, VERTICAL CONTRACTS IN THE VIDEO RENTAL INDUSTRY
4-5 (2006), http://mortimer.fas.harvard.edu/06jmp 1201.pdf [hereinafter VERTICAL CONTRACTS].
207. See generally Jozefowicz et al., supra note 161.
208. PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308.
209. VERTICAL CONTRACTS, supra note 206, at 4-5.
210. Id.
211. See History of Home Video, supra note 52 (noting how both the studios and video
rental stores, Blockbuster in particular, grew together and made hundreds of millions of dollars in
revenue).
212. See generally Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
213. PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308.
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market; due to price discrimination laws, rental companies can also
214purchase the DVD at the same price. ' Accordingly, rental companies
have two different options today than they did a decade ago: (1) purchase
DVDs at the low sale price offered to the general public; 215 or (2) purchase
the DVD directly from the studio's distributors at a slightly lower price and
share the revenue with the film studios. 216 It is no mystery why Netflix
and Redbox chose to purchase DVDs at a low price instead of sharing its
revenues with the studios.
Under the First Sale Doctrine, rental companies can generate a
significant amount of revenue from potential DVD buyers without giving
just compensation to the studios. 217 Because the First Sale Doctrine creates
this situation, it undermines the rationale of the intellectual property clause
in the U.S. Constitution.218 Since consumers rent DVDs more frequently
than they purchase them, studios are losing a significant portion of their
revenue.2 19  In many instances, rental companies do not adequately
compensate the studios for their diminished profits beyond the initial
purchase price. 220 Consequently, fewer films are being financed and
produced. This, in turn, results in thousands of lost jobs.222
Furthermore, the First Sale Doctrine is stifling the creative activity of
authors. 223 Rather than incentivizing studios to generate creative works of
art-which the Supreme Court has recognized "is the best way to advance
public welfare" 224-- the First Sale Doctrine is causing the studios to
produce fewer films. 225
214. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 387, 401 (Spring 2008).
215. Id.
216. See King, supra note 20.
217. See Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns, 474 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir.
2007).
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
219. Ahead of the Bell, supra note 30.
220. See Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
221. Cieply, supra note 11.
222. Lord of the Rings-New Zealand, New Zealand Tourism Guide,
http://www.tourism.net.nz/lord-of-the-rings.html (noting, for example, that over 2,000 people
were employed during production of the Lord of the Rings movies).
223. Video rental companies are using the First Sale Doctrine to withhold just compensation
from the movie studios. Because the studios are being deprived of this revenue, they are
producing fewer films. See Cieply, supra note 11.
224. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
225. Cieply, supra note 11.
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C. Congress Needs to Take Action
Congress must rectify this problem, as the current situation is
unsustainable. 226 Some studios have entered into profit-sharing
agreements with various rental companies, 227 while other studios have
prohibited their distributors from selling newly released DVDs to rental
companies for a specified amount of time. 228 Wanting full access to newly
released DVDs, Redbox has sued the studios that are restricting its access
to the distributors. 229 This has created an uneven legal landscape where
some studios receive compensation from some video rental businesses, but
not from others. 230 Because studios are not being justly compensated for
all their creative works, they are producing significantly fewer movies,
which, in turn, reduces the available job opportunities. 231 The end result:
the public good is suffering greatly. 232
Much like fine artists, film studios are no longer justly compensated
for their work. 233 Film studios rely on income from both box office
receipts and DVD sales because many movies only become profitable
when consumers buy the DVD.234 Accordingly, if DVD sales continue to
plummet, film studios will produce fewer films because they will no longer
be able to rely on DVD sales to make the movies profitable. 235 Congress
needs to pass a law-similar to a droit de suite law 236-that will promote
the public good by requiring additional compensation to the copyright
owner. This law will put more money in the studios' pockets to produce
226. See generally Barnes, supra note 8; Finke, supra note 9.
227. See King, supra note 20.
228. Goldstein, supra note 20.
229. See Samantha Clark & Marcy Magiera, Redbox Sues Fox on DVDs, DAILY VARIETY,
Aug. 13, 2009.
230. E.g., Goldstein, supra note 20 (discussing how some studios are waiting 28 days before
they sell their DVDs to Redbox); DiOrio, supra note 25 (discussing how Warner Bros. and
Netflix agreed to wait 28 days after a DVD hits the market before Netflix starts renting them to
their customers).
231. Cieply, supra note 11.
232. The author concludes that the public is significantly harmed because there are fewer
movies to enjoy and less jobs available to people. See id.
233. Lieberman, supra note 182; Redbox Roulette, supra note 189.
234. Horn, supra note 4 ("Even a box-office blockbuster may reach profit only when it
arrives on DVD shelves because movies have become so expensive to produce and market.");
Epstein, supra note 4 ("Nowadays, in the new Hollywood, the world box office is a money
loser.").
235. Ault, supra note 190.
236. E.g. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (2009); Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 346)
61 (EC).
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more films, which in turn promotes the public good. 237 Like a droit de
suite law, the party that should pay the additional compensation is the party
that actually profits from the copyright owner's work-the rental
companies. 238
The current landscape of the film industry is very different than what
it was in the early 1980s when the first video rental amendment failed in
Congress. 239 In the early 1980s, there were many unknowns about the
emerging rental industry, particularly its potential effect on the film
studios. 240  The studios were unable to convince Congress that the rental
industry would damage their business. 241 Moreover, the film industry still
had viable non-legislative options. 242 Film studios eventually raised the
initial price of a video to about $100, which made the price prohibitively
high, such that only rental companies bought the video. 243 This price
increase enabled film studios to recover the lost revenue in sales that
resulted from people renting movies instead of buying them. 244
The linear rental pricing model is an unsustainable business model
today. 245 In fact, under that model, the DVD sales business, which is
already suffering greatly, could be irreparably harmed.246 If the studios
used the same formula as they did in the early 1980s to calculate a price
that accounts for lost DVD sales to rentals, the initial price for a DVD
could be as high as $225. 247 At that price, many consumers, other than
237. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954).
238. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 986; Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61
(EC).
239. See generally PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308 (noting that in the 1980s
the studios set up a linear rental pricing scheme, while the studios are now setting a low sell-thru
price as soon as the DVD hits the market).
240. See generally Castonguay, supra note 51, at 9. Specifically, the MPAA was worried
that this new technology would destroy the industry. Unbeknownst to it, the studios would
ultimately benefit greatly from this new technology. Jozefowicz et al., supra note 161.
241. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 372.
242. See generally PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1310-11 (discussing the linear
rental pricing option).
243. Id.
244. See generally Jozefowicz et al., supra note 161.
245. As DVD sales continue falling, consumers still do not want to pay for a DVD at the
current price. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5. Also, higher prices could lead to an increase in
piracy, and "a sell-through pricing strategy is aimed at discouraging piracy." PRICE
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308.
246. Id.
247. This number was calculated by the consumer price index inflation calculator. In 1982,
$100 would roughly equate to $225 in 2009. Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
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video rental companies, would be unwilling to pay for a DVD.248
Furthermore, by making a creative work only available to a certain group
of people-even if there were enough rental copies to satisfy everyone's
needs-this option would run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. 249
Moreover, today's technology makes movie-pirating easy. 250 A
simple Google search can help any novice find a movie online within
seconds. 251 Nevertheless, film piracy has not crippled the industry. 252
When consumers are given a choice between content provided by the
studio and pirated content, most people prefer the legitimate studio
option.253  For example, Hulu, a joint online venture between several
Hollywood studios, streams television shows and movies.254 This online
service became enormously popular and successful because the available
content was free and high quality. 255  The only inconvenience viewers
experience is the occasional commercial break, which most people do not
mind.256 Compared to the poor quality of bootleg films, consumers choose
higher quality, legal content available at Hulu. 257
However, if a linear rental pricing formula is reintroduced, many
significant problems can anse. 258 Under a linear rental pricing scheme, the
consumer will have the following choices: (1) purchase an overpriced
DVD; (2) wait for the film to become available through a rental company
(which can be a while if demand is high); or (3) watch a lower quality,
bootleg version of the film online for free. If these were the options
available to consumers, it is not a stretch to assume that more people would
248. If a significant amount of people are unwilling to pay for a DVD at the current price, it
would only be logical that the same amount of people, if not more, would be unwilling to pay for
DVDs at a higher price. See Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
249. See generally Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
250. Eriq Gardner, Paramount Antipiracy Speech Pirated, HOLLYWOOD REP., ESQ., Sept.
23, 2009, http://www.thresq.com/2009/09/paramount-filesharing.htnil.
251. For example, a person can go to Google and type in a search with the words "Avatar"
"online" "movie" and "free" and several sites appear that a person can either download the movie
or watch the movie streaming online.
252. See generally Ben Drawbaugh, Hollywood Still Doesn't Understand Why People
Pirate Content, ENGADGET HD, Feb. 27, 2009, http://hd.engadget.com/2009/02/27/hollywood-
still-doesnt-understand-why-people-pirate-content/.
253. Id.
254. Hulu, About, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited April 4, 2010).
255. Frank Rose, Hulu, a Victim of Its Own Success? WIRED.COM, May 12, 2009,
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/hulu-victim-success/.
256. See generally id.
257. Id.; Drawbaugh, supra note 252.
258. As previously noted, the threat of piracy always looms in the background. See
generally PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308.
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pirate films, which in turn could create a deadly piracy problem for the
studios. 259
The situation the film industry now faces is similar to that which the
computer software industry faced in the 1990s. 260 Due to the First Sale
Doctrine, film studios are producing fewer movies. 261 In order to produce
more movies, the studios will have to raise DVD prices to account for the
revenue lost to rentals. 262 However, due to the likely exponential increase
in piracy, even if the studios wanted to raise DVD prices, they would be
unable to do so. 263 This is exactly like the situation Congress tried to
prevent when it passed the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act. 264
This option would "encourage unauthorized copying, depriv[ing] copyright
owners of a return on [their] investment, and thereby discourag[ing]
creation of new products."265
Without congressional action, the film industry only has a few options
available. 266 The film studios can maintain the status quo and allow DVD
rental companies-that do not enter into revenue-sharing agreements-to
siphon off their profits without justly compensating the studios. 267 This
option will result in studios producing fewer movies, which is already
occurring. 268 Some studios are trying to prevent rental companies from
obtaining copies of their movies,269 thereby spurring lawsuits from the
DVD rental industry. 270 However, the First Sale Doctrine prevents the
studios from putting restrictions on how the consumer uses the DVD once
that DVD is purchased. 271 Further yet, the film studios can raise the initial
DVD price to an exceptionally high price to account for lost sales replaced
259. See generally id.
260. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 324.
261. Cieply, supra note 11.
262. By increasing the price of a DVD and going back to the linear rental pricing system in
place during the 1990s, studios would be able to partially recover losses due to video rentals. See
PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308.
263. See id.
264. LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 324.
265. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939.
266. Many studios are not yet sure how exactly they are going to handle the current
situation. Lieberman, supra note 182.
267. Id.; Redbox Roulette, supra note 189.
268. Cieply, supra note 11.
269. Goldstein, supra note 20.
270. Clark & Magiera, supra note 229.
271. Nakashima, supra note 21; Olga Kharif, Wal-Mart, Target Put Squeeze on Redbox,
BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 2, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2010/tc201OO22_125668.htm.
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by rentals. 272 As explained, this could cause an exponential increase in
piracy. 273
D. Proposal. The Film Rental Exception
Congress should pass a film rental exception to the First Sale
Doctrine. Under this proposal, a company would be barred from renting
out a DVD for direct or indirect commercial advantage without
compensating the copyright owner.274 This exception would mirror the
EU's regulation; however, this model should be modified to adapt to the
current situation confronting the U.S. film industry. 275
In order to best promote the sciences and useful arts, this proposed
law should not be exactly like Europe's Rental Right Directive, which bans
video rentals without the copyright owner's permission.276 Instead, this
exception should generally ban video rentals that fail to justly compensate
the original copyright owner.277 This suggestion closely mirrors
California's Resale Royalty Act, which allows the transactions to proceed
as long as the original copyright owner is appropriately compensated.278
During congressional hearings on this exception, Congress should
determine what just compensation for the studios would be. It could be set
at five percent of the total revenue of the product, as with the California
Resale Royalty Act, 279 or some other percentage that Congress deems
appropriate.
The film studios are being hurt financially-many by major rental
companies, such as Netflix and Redbox, with whom they do not have a
rental agreement in place. 280 However, the studios that do have rental
272. This option would be similar to the one the film industry had in place during the
1990's. PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 63, at 1308.
273. Id. at 1309.
274. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (2009); Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32,
34.
275. The situation between Europe's landscape in late 1999 and the US landscape in 2010 is
starkly different. Most notably, Redbox and Netflix have become established businesses, which
should neither be shut down nor at the mercy of the studios until a revenue-sharing agreement is
negotiated. See History of Redbox, supra note 76, at 1; Netflix Press Kit, supra note 77, at 2.
276. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 501. See Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J.
(L 346) 61, 62 (EC).
277. Otherwise, Netflix and Redbox would have to shut down operations until they
negotiated an agreement with the studios. This proposal allows Netflix and Redbox to stay in
business, while ensuring the studios receive just compensation.
278. California Arts Council, supra note 106.
279. Id.
280. Netflix and Redbox have millions of customers and earn millions of dollars in revenue
compared to local mom and pop shops that lack the requisite nationwide customer base. See
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agreements with these companies are seeing economic advantages. 281 In
fact, some of these revenue-sharing agreements are netting hundreds of
millions of dollars in revenue for the studios. 282 Without these agreements
in place, the rental companies would logically hold onto this revenue. 283
Because the problem lies in the absence of a revenue-sharing agreement,
the law should honor all agreements between the studios and rental
companies. This law should create a default, minimal plan in place, unless
the two parties can come to an agreement.
The law should also set a minimum amount of revenue that the rental
company has to generate before it is governed by this new law. The
purpose of this provision would be two-fold. First, it would make the law
easier to enforce by limiting the number of parties to identify. 284 Second, it
would promote the public good by creating a greater economic incentive to
film studios to produce more movies, thus increasing the availability of
films. 285 In turn, it would likely create more job opportunities. Larger
rental companies are better suited to compensate the studios because these
rental companies can spread the higher costs over a wider base of
customers, thus minimizing the cost increases. 286 However, if this law is
to be applied to every business, small rental shops may be forced to
increase prices possibly to a point that most consumers would be unwilling
to pay. 287 These small businesses may have to close down, because
consumers would likely resort to a cheaper option, such as Netflix or
Redbox.288 This would not benefit the public good and would go against
what this constitutional clause seeks to accomplish. 289
History of Redbox, supra note 76, at 1; Netflix Press Kit, supra note 77, at 2.
281. Goldstein, supra note 20.
282. Id.
283. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1389
(C.D. Cal. 1993).
284. By having fewer companies to expect payment from, the studios can easily check from
a short list whether a rental company has paid them or not. One of the reasons why the EU's
droit de suite law has been very effective is that it only applies to auctions. All the energy that it
takes to enforce the law is thus focused on one manageable area. Hall, supra note 119, at 33 1.
285. See generally Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(discussing that stimulating creative works is done by securing a fair return for the author's
work).
286. Rich Greifher, Why We Like Big Moats, YAHOO! FINANCE, Jan. 20, 2010,
http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/why-we-like-big-moats-foolcouk-cd0188c18462.html (noting
that "bigger companies can offer products at a lower cost than smaller ones can" because they
"can spread [their] operational costs across a wide store base" and therefore "undercut [their]
competitors on price and still turn a tidy profit").
287. See e.g., id.
288. See generally id.
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful
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VI. CONCLUSION
The film industry is at a crucial pass. Studios may potentially lose
billions of dollars due to slumping DVD sales. 290 Furthermore, studios are
producing fewer movies. 291 The film industry is trying to correct the
situation itself, but it simply cannot.292 The film industry cannot charge
one price to an individual consumer and a higher price to a business
because the practice would violate price discrimination laws.293 It would
be unreasonable to charge a higher initial price for DVDs because it would
likely have fatal consequences to DVD sales and encourage people to
obtain the copyrighted work through other means, such as piracy.294
Preventing the studios' distributors from selling DVDs to the rental
industry would only minimally affect the current situation because the
rental industry could still purchase the exact same product from a local
Wal-Mart or Best Buy. 295 Furthermore, the rental industry would likely
sue the studios that try to prevent it from purchasing those DVDs.296
The rental industry is abusing the First Sale Doctrine as technology
advances. 297 Rental companies profit from the film industry's product, 298
which contributes to the film industry's financial problems. 299 As a result,
the studios produce fewer creative works. 300 The film industry depends on
the revenue generated from DVD sales to create more jobs by producing
Arts .... ").
290. Studios Feel Pinch, supra note 7.
291. Cieply, supra note 11.
292. See generally Goldstein, supra note 20; DiOrio, supra note 25, at 1.
293. VERTICAL CONTRACTS, supra note 206, at 5.
294. DVD sales are falling and people already do not want to pay for a DVD, at the current
price. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5. Also, higher prices could lead to an increase in piracy,
and "a sell-through pricing strategy is aimed at discouraging piracy." PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 63, at 1309.
295. Ahead of the Bell, supra note 30. Recently, Wal-Mart and Target limited the amount
of DVDs a customer can buy at anytime, which makes it harder for Redbox to stock up on DVDs
by purchasing them at a retail store. However, it is not impossible because the employee can just
go to a store that does not have such a policy, like Best Buy, or return to the store several times
throughout the day and buy the maximum amount of DVDs allowed. Kharif, supra note 271.
296. Clark & Magiera, supra note 229.
297. The First Sale Doctrine is being used by the video rental companies to withhold just
compensation from the movie studios. Because the studios are being deprived of this revenue,
they are producing fewer films. See generally Ahead of the Bell, supra note 30; Graser &
Magiera, supra note 5, at 1; Cieply, supra note 11.
298. Graser & Magiera, supra note 5.
299. Id.
300. Cieply, supra note 11.
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more films. 301 The First Sale Doctrine, originally created to limit the
author from getting more than what she deserves, 302 now causes the film
industry to receive less than it deserves. o Worse still, this current
application of the First Sale Doctrine directly conflicts with the intellectual
property clause of the U.S. Constitution. 304 Rather than stimulating the
creative arts, it is indirectly causing the film studios to release fewer
films. 305 In order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts," 306 Congress must take action and pass a film rental exception to the
First Sale Doctrine.
Ryan Sullivan *
301. Horn, supra note 4 ("Even a box-office blockbuster may reach profit only when it
arrives on DVD shelves because movies have become so expensive to produce and market.");
Epstein, supra note 4 ("Nowadays, in the new Hollywood, the world box office is a money
loser.").
302. Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns, 474 F. 3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2007).
303. See Lieberman, supra note 182.
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